Login HereThe 2006 shift by the Sunnis, beginning in Anbar province, away from Al Qaeda in Iraq was among the most important developments in the Iraq War. Ever since it happened, however, some stalwart friends and I have tended to focus on its dark sides -- the rise of warlordism, primarily -- as well point out how transactional and reversible the shift was in the fact of outside (read: sectarian) pressures. That seems to be taking shape.
Dr. iRack and Abu Aardvark have been all over this. Most recently, a key Son of Iraq (as the mostly-Sunni militiamen are now known) named Abu Abed has fled to Jordan while the Maliki government investigates him for murder. Dr. iRack:
Separate from the merits or demerits of the Abu Abed case specifically, Abu Abed is not just a guy--he is a symbol. His treatment, in conjunction with other evidence of disdain for the SoIs emanating from Maliki and his coterie, could signal that former Sunni fighters will be locked out (and chased out) from integration and accommodation efforts. If so, there is a real risk of the SoI program imploding, taking much of the recent security progress with it. As Abu Abed himself warned: "Al Qaeda will come back and the government and Iraqi army will be helpless to defeat them. People will have lost their faith in the government because of the way they treated me and others."
The Abu Abed case crystallizes the place that the war has brought us to. If we don't keep paying off the SOI warlords/militiamen -- there are probably over 100,000 of them by now -- then they have little incentive to keep their guns pointed away from U.S. troops, as the Maliki government has made it clear it distrusts them intensely. If we keep paying off the SOI warlords/militiamen, we undermine the ability of the government that we still support to ever achieve a monopoly on the use of force, and put cash into the pockets of brutal men who, in many cases, promise to shoot their way to power. If we don't keep paying off the SOI warlords/militiamen, al-Qaeda could reemerge in Iraq. If we keep paying off the SOI warlords/militiamen, the Shiites in the government will remain intransigent in terms of reconciliation, fearing that the armed Sunnis are getting ready to take a mile if given an inch. If we keep paying off the SOI warlords/militiamen, we risk a resurgence of violence. If we don't keep paying off the SOI warlords/militiamen, we risk a resurgence of violence. Any and all of these possibilities exist whether or not we keep paying off the SOI warlords/militiamen. Pick your poison.
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Sure, this is a deadly dilemma if you’re a normal, conscientious person.
But if you’re a Bush/Cheneyite, this is considered a “housewarming gift” for Barack Obama. Whichever bad choice he selects, they’ll blame him for screwing things up.
Mission accomplished.
I suspect that a monopoly on the use of force just might be a tad elusive. It’s more likely that our mission will be to try to oversee a power-sharing arrangement.
Seems as if after many attempts over the years to support/pay off one group or another to do the things against some government that we’d like to do ourselves (but can’t, for various reasons) - and earning a FAIL and setting up the future enemy for ourselves as well (cenral america, old shawish Iran, anti-russian taliban, ’sons of Iraq’, beluchi tribesman in current Iran, etc., that we’d learn to think ahead to ask what if the golden opportunity doesn’t work, and understand that its a long game.
Just think: we are supporting a Shite government in Iraq that is very closely tied to Iran by religion - and whom the US is treatening war with, and opposing Sunni elements that are clearly supported by Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-dominated states - and whom we depend upon for oil. And we act like one party can prevail in this? That’s some pretty strong self-delusion the neo-cons and the Cheney cabal are smoking.
Interesting question: imagine a near future where the US didn’t import any oil from outside our borders. What would our foreign policy be in the Islamic mid-east and south asia? If we could answer that question to the US majority’s satisfaction, perhaps we could have policies that actually make sense on their short and long term faces. Since the hypothetical isn’t true, we seem intent on making the worse of the situation we’re in: too many cooks spoiling the soup.
Is this really indicative of any broader trend?
I can’t imagine any of these SOI guys don’t have bodies on them and racked them up while operating as an extrajudical force then just as they are now.
Extrajudicial killings are murder. Might be that this is a card Maliki et al are playing against them, could just be that he tagged someone who’s now got a bit of pull in Shiia circles with the Shiia govt and is looking for justice. I can’t imagine these SOI are afforded any grace on former actions by former victims’ families. I wouldn’t be giving them any.
Anyways, in the world of 3D chess, there’s about 17 games going on here at once on the same board, so I don’t think everything can be analysed in real time. End of the day, you’ve gotta pay those SoI until you can turn them into a legitimate arm of the state security services. Going without them isn’t an option.
Personally I like the approach taken by the old man Assad in Syria. If you know you’re going to have factions of your armed forces disloyal to you, make sure you know all the key commanders by name and ask them about their families, by name, when you chat. Ain’t pretty, but it works.
You give a good example of why this ain’t gonna work. Assad had firm control over the mechanisms of statecraft. Importantly, he came up through the military, and kept one of closest allies as defense minister. (If I’m not mistaken, the guy is still there under Assad Jr.) Neither Maliki, nor his successor, has anything close to a functioning state to counterbalance the SOI.
I was going to make a sly comment about the former model for that type of state apparatus, the kind of guy you need at the top and the, um, HR policies you need to run it. But I really have no idea how you’d even get there from here.
Religion would be the quickest glue for that kind of loyalty, but also the bloodiest and most politically troublesome. Sure there’s Iran, but there’s also the rest of the region that simply not Shiite.