DENVER, Colo. — Mind taking a couple minutes away from convention-centricity? I have a new piece out in the Washington Independent about Joshua Casteel, a former interrogator at Abu Ghraib, who paints a picture of an intelligence process where, stunningly, torture was not the end of the U.S.’s problems.

Under pressure from his commanders, Casteel was ordered to interrogate detainees at length even after he was convinced they knew little or nothing about the insurgency — a diversion of resources that, he said, wasted time and energy. Worse, he was cut off from the rest of the intelligence process, lacking the ability to judge the reliability of those whose confessions and anonymous tips had led to the detentions of the men he interrogated.

In addition, he was given a quota of so-called “actionable intelligence” he had to get out of his interrogations, regardless of whether those he interrogated knew anything valuable. Then, when his interrogations ended, he was never able to learn if those arrested as the result of his interrogations were dangerous terrorists or innocent people.

This is the sort of systemic problem that nearly never gets addressed: the