We’ve heard a lot lately about how Moqtada al-Sadr’s power is currently at a low ebb. The Iraqi security forces have moved against Sadr’s Mahdi Army/JAM in Basra and in Baghdad, and the U.S. continues its military pressure on JAM as well. But it appears that Sadr sees opposition to the Bush-Maliki basing accords as a mechanism for reasserting his relevance. And he’s not really doing it through opposition. He’s opting instead to make himself useful to Maliki. Consider this argument, located at the bottom of a Times account of an anti-accord Sadrist protest:

The event was carefully planned in concert with the Iraqi government, which agreed to supply security to ensure that there were no attacks on the protesters, said Muhanned al-Gharrawi, a Sadr lieutenant in Najaf.

“They will benefit from the demonstration,” Mr. Gharrawi said, referring to the government. He explained further that if the Americans pressure the prime minister, “He will say: ‘It is not up to me. The masses want this.’ ”

That’s not a bad argument at all. Sadr makes a credible case at being an authentic voice of Shiite Iraq, and in the process takes an action that appeals to Sunni sensibilities as well. Maliki gets to exercise leadership on the most broadly-popular issue in Iraq — anti-occupation fervor — and show a display of Shiite unity, a first-order priority of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The U.S. can think of worse outcomes, especially if we like the idea of getting out of Iraq.

Sadr’s viability as a political force is unquestionable. The actual question is what kind of military capability Sadr will retain. There’s little reason to expect he can’t regroup the Mahdi Army, particularly as tension remains over the future of the mostly-Sunni militias known as the Sons of Iraq. Every single time he’s been written off — always by the U.S., never by Iraqis — he comes back. If the Mahdi Army can be persuaded to operate as a neighborhood auxiliary force, like how the U.S. describes the Sons of Iraq, wouldn’t that be an acceptable outcome? I learned from years of reporting on militia issues that traditional Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration approaches — typically the way to remove combatants from the fields of internecine conflict — don’t work here. But what if the government trades Sons of Iraq integration for Mahdi Army integration? I recognize I’m assuming Sadr desires such a thing, and that may not be true. But if he does, I wonder if that wouldn’t be a viable pan-sectarian solution to the militia problem.