Joshua Foust says I’ve been writing too many platitudes about the Karzai-Taliban negotiations. I think he means I’m guilty of wishful thinking, and I can see how he has a point there, at least on the breezy blockquote he picks out. So let me take up this question:

My question is: how? Has the Taliban—any faction since 2004 or so—demonstrated itself to be a good-faith negotiator? If so (and even if not), how do you “methodically apply peaceful inducement” (whatever the hell that means) to convince Taliban members they won’t be thrown into Bagram’s torture cells the moment they stand down?

 On the question of the Taliban’s good faith, I can’t speak to motives, and I’m just going off of the reporting that I’ve linked to. To be clearer, the Gall report and the Ignatius report and the VOA report about the Pak-Afgh mini-jirga have all reported either a) the Afgh/Pak officials have some reason to think there’s a real shot at this, or b) some former Taliban officials are seeing the basis for an opening. In the final analysis, I guess all I’m saying is that it’s worth testing their seriousness, because the a) the alternative is open-ended warfare and b) the potential upshot is tremendous and in our interest. I will admit that this is comes close to substituting hope for a plan. But attempting to negotiate is cost-free.

Crossposted to The Streak.

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