Ha’aretz correspondents Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff think Israel, despite the apocalyptic rhetoric, is actually prepared to pull back when the Air Force exhausts its bombing targets. (They name Ehud Barak as an advocate of "caution.") That’s because if Israel doesn’t accept a ceasefire soon, it will have no choice but to invade, which Hamas hopes it will:

The operation’s goals, as defined by the cabinet, are "creating a different long-term security situation in the south, while bolstering Israel’s deterrence." The IDF does not interpret this to mean a complete end to the rocket fire, as it considers this impossible. Rather, its goal is to eliminate Hamas’ desire to attack Israel. The bombing campaign has so far dealt a severe blow to Hamas.

However, ground forces are already in place for the next phase. The Gazan mud will make it harder for tanks and armored personnel carriers to maneuver, and Hamas has clearly been preparing its defense for months. Thus any ground operation will entail many casualties, which is one of the government’s considerations in deciding how the operation should proceed….

But Hamas officials and analysts said Monday that the organization would actually like Israel to launch a ground operation; it hopes this would let it inflict such heavy losses on Israeli tanks and infantry that Israel would flee with its tail between its legs.

First off, to define the goal of the campaign in metaphysical terms — how do you know when Hamas’ "will" is broken? — while acknowledging that destroying Hamas’ capability to attack is unrealistic is nothing short of foolish. Second, the Haaretz writers note that no matter what Hamas will claim victory as long as there’s one member of Hamas left alive. How do we know that? Because they saw that it worked in Lebanon.

And that leads to the third point. How and why was Hezbollah able to claim victory in Lebanon? Because Israel invaded with the exact same kind of all-out-war and final-battle and once-and-for-all rhetoric, when it could never possibly have erased Hezbollah from the face of the earth. When you do that, you give your enemy the means to win: his unbroken will. That’s why the rhetoric out of Israel is counterproductive — in these types of wars, it’s never just rhetoric. It’s the definition of the strategic terms.

Now, given that initial blunder, is it better for Israel to simply accept a ceasefire and accept the taunts of Hamas that Israel couldn’t defeat the people of Gaza, etc? Absolutely. Perhaps it will get a better ceasefire than the status quo ante, with reduced Hamas capabilities, and if there’s still a Hamas, there’s still a Hamas — after all, it was never realistic that Israel would actually destroy Hamas. But if the Israelis really do fear the loss of their deterrent from Lebanon — which is kind of chimerical; Israel is the regional superpower, and it says a lot that Hamas’s rockets are crude Qassams — then stopping now might play into the same psychodrama. But it would still be objectively better for Israel.

Crossposted to The Streak.