Jason Sigger combs through Adm. Mullen’s comment that Iran has enough low-enriched uranium for a bomb and observes:

So deliberately absent from this discussion are a few minor facts – that Iran would have to 1) move the LEU out from storage in full view of international inspectors, 2) use a lot more centrifuges to enrich the uranium, which still won’t be as good as highly-enriched uranium (HEU), 3) develop a nuclear warhead and prove it will work (maybe AQ Khan can help them), 4) develop a small enough nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile, and 5) convince the world that it wants to use its one nuclear weapon to blackmail Israel, Europe, and the United States. Sounds like a tall order.

It’s amazing to me how the military leadership and the political leaders in this administration want to keep the same opinions and make the same mistakes as the previous administration. That is to say, we have all these Very Serious People noting how we "can’t let Iran have the bomb" while refusing to consider the technical challenges in creating a nuclear bomb, refusing to consider Iran’s motives and diplomatic options, refusing to consider U.S., European, and Israeli options – diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic – and refusing to consider the years – decades – of nuclear weapons strategy that we’ve developed.

It seems to me that Jason’s a bit premature in his conclusion. I haven’t seen much sky-is-falling commentary since Mullen made his chat-show declaration. But I have little doubt that it’s just a matter of time before the film unspools the way Jason describes. 

One of the more curious moments in Bob Gates’ Meet The Press appearance yesterday came when David Gregory asked Gates if the U.S. could compel an to the Iranian nuclear program "short of some kind of grand bargain." Well, what’s wrong with a grand bargain? If it turns out there’s no way of reaching such a bargain — Gates retorted with his usual quip about his decades-long search for The Iranian Moderate — that’s one thing. But to set the idea of a grand bargain as outside the scope of acceptable costs is to guarantee that we’re stuck with the same failed, futile or unappealing options as we’ve had for the past 30 years, and to probably ensure the continuation of the program. Indeed, Gregory fleshed out "grand bargain" by saying he meant "in other words, bigger carrots and bigger sticks," which goes to show how surface-deep the thinking on what a bargain might look like is. 

Better to deal with the sources of Iranian/American hostility, as the Leveretts have proposed.