I’ll be the first to admit I don’t really understand sea power or the Navy. I just don’t have a background in it, or familiarity with it, aside from occasionally enjoying a relaxing trip to Annapolis when the weather gets nice. That’s why the U.S. Naval Institute’s blog has been such a valuable resource for me. So when the Washington Independent says, "You know, you really ought to write something on the aftermath of the Maersk Alabama incident," I turn to my new friends at the USNI blog for help. The result is this just-published piece:

 … beyond the rescue lie warning signs about continued threats from low-tech adversaries operating in shallow waters. The current U.S. Naval strategy, written under then-Navy chief Adm. Mike Mullen — now the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — has won plaudits for emphasizing increased international maritime cooperation. But reformers say it hasn’t gone far enough to restructure the Navy around low-intensity operations and support to special operations forces, rather than operations far out at sea. “You have to have a balanced force,” said Eric Wertheim, a columnist for “Proceedings,” the journal of the U.S. Naval Institute, and author of “Combat Fleets of The World,” in an interview.

What Wertheim and like-minded Naval theorists have in mind isn’t a rebalance of the U.S. fleet overwhelmingly for close-encounter anti-piracy missions, but increasing Naval capabilities for such actions alongside traditional Naval priorities like deterring and fighting adversaries far out in the oceans and protecting shipping lanes. In that respect, they sound much like their ground-force counterparts who argue for a place in the U.S. Army to emphasize counterinsurgency operations as well as combat between two traditional states’ armies. The Maersk Alabama incident may have provided public attention to the threats they’ve been warning about. “Before, [the Navy] didn’t see a need for it,” said Raymond Pritchett, a U.S. Naval Institute analyst and blogger, though he cautioned that it still might not. “There’s a maverick community in surface-warfare community that’s pushing for” greater low-intensity conflict efforts.

That’s Galrahn, my friends. Special guest appearance in the piece by Abu Muqawama. All mistakes, inelegant phrasings, misunderstandings, oversimplifications and other such errors are, of course, my own. If you’re part of the naval community, this piece might very well read like it’s written in Engrish. This is me climbing up a learning curve. Anyhow, I hope there’s something of value for you in the piece.