Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal sent a written statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on detention policy, which is a focal point of criticism for his nomination to head the Afghanistan war. “We must at all times obligation treat detainees humanely … military necessity does not permit us” to deviate from those obligations, it reads, according to Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), who reads from it.
But what about Camp Nama? How many Special Mission Unit Task Forces were there? The Senate Armed Services Committee report on torture determined that a memorandum on harsh detainee treatment from former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in December 2002 informed detainee policy for those task forces.
“Sir, there were multiple,” he replied. Between two and four in Afghanistan; as many as eight to ten task forces in Iraq when he was commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. McChrystal was never a commander of one of those units but they were subordinate to McChrystal. What did he know about the treatment of detainees? Levin wants to know.
“I do not and have not condone the mistreatment of detainees and I never will.” McChrystal said he investigated every abuse allegation. But the interrogation structure was inadequate for his task forces. “We stayed within all the established and authorized guidelines, they were there when I took command,” McChrystal says. He says “constant improvement” turned something “acceptable and legal” into something “I could be more proud of” as time wore on. Concedes that he initially was informed by Rumsfeld’s memorandum authorizing “stress positions, use of dogs and nudity” and said that “some of [those techniques] were used.” He said he was uncomfortable with those authorized techniques and worked to reduce their usage.
McChrystal added, in response to a question from Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), that the interrogation techniques outlined in the Army Field Manual on interrogation are “absolutely” sufficient and he does not seek any others.
Update: I got ahold of McChrystal’s full letter to the committee and published it here.
Crossposted to The Streak.
Login Here




27 Comments
Spotlight


Support this site!
Subscribe to the newsletter
Advertise on Firedoglake
Send
us your tips
Make us your homepage
About ATTACKERMAN
Advanced search
RSS/XML Feed
Thanks Spencer
I’m glad you are covering this Spencer. I have the hearing on now and per Jim’s diary yesterday, isn’t kind of a conflict of interest for Lindsay Graham to be active in the military?
I don’t know what to think of this McChrystal guy. How can one NOT know how detainees are being treated? At least he said he was for one global strategy for handling detainees, whatever that means.
Read: Yeah, I was the boss, but those bad apples under me would not listen. I am too much of a milque-toast liberal do have gained thier allegence!
Plausible deniability. To protect himself, he CAN’T know-therefore, since the treatment was illegal and it is the soldier’s tradition to protect his superiors, it is logical that they wouldn’t tell him. That way, he can say “not me” with a straight face, and be telling the truth.
Not saying that is what happened here, just that there is precedent.
DADT
When a General has people working about 6 levels removed from his direct supervision, how is he supposed to know when illegal activity occurs unless one of his subordinates tells him?
A General, in this case a 3 star, is the equivalent of say a factory manager in a factory that employes 9- 12,000 people. There is no way that the person at the top can know what is going on several layers below him. And unlike the factory model, an Army General usually has little or no idea who the company or team leaders might be or what qualifications they bring.
So, it is entirely believable when he says that he did not have any knowledge of what was going on at the team level.
You are asking that a general officer micromanage the troops working under him. Can’t be done, shouldn’t be done. He is responsible for everything that anyone in his command does, but most of the time he has no idea until something blows up and creates the sh*t storm that is now ongoing.
While in Vietnam I observed many company grade officers lie like hell to their superior officers, mostly to keep their troops alive in the face of a really stupid order, or to please the idiots at the top who were obsessed by the numbers that Westmorland ordered be kept track of. All of the stats quoted at the 5 o’clock follies were WAGs at best and totally made up at worst. Command operates in a bubble, not unlike the bubble that surrounds a prez(like gwb) and the bubble that MACV operated in was so tight that reality could not find a way in.
Here’s my question: What role did Levin play in all this abuse?
Can’t we demand that at the very least they go back and give us a version of Levin’s report that doesn’t black out every instance of McCrystal’s name?
He has never condoned mistreatment of detainees, but he did ok his guys o use “stress positions, use of dogs and nudity”
So – is no one asking him whether or not he considers “stress positions, use of dogs and nudity” mistreatment and if not, then maybe he needs to turn in his uniform, but if so, maybe he needs to rethink his statement in uniform to Congress about whether he condoned detainee mistreatment?
If you were just talking about a series of detention camps run down chain I might buy some of that, but here the main mission of McChrystal’s crew was to get Zarqawi and Camp Nama was point on that mission. There’s no way he didn’t have any interaction with what was going on there – and saying that he was “uncomfortable” with the use of nudity and stress positions etc. and “worked” to “reduce” their instances is basically saying that yes, he did know.
Rationalizing incompetence is no explanation. There is still a such thing as Military Accountability, but if you’re trying to say that the chain of command in the US military has broken down, then that’s a completely different message than the one you posted.
He was in charge of JSOC, which consists of special forces from all service branchs. What this means is that he was in charge, but the branchs ie, Nvy, Army, USMC, AF could and did send teams out on orders that he would have no knowledge of. Since units like say Navy SEALS fall under the SecDef the General would be totally out of the loop. One could say that he was in charge overall, accounting, administrative, training, coordinating branchs, but had very little or no knowledge of operational details. He could issue dirctives on prisoner interrogations, but if rumsfeld directed teams to use torture he would not be aware of that. JSOC operates under rules of extreme secrecy, the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing. I can’t really think of any movie or TV show that might give you some idea about how compartmented these units/teams are(the unit is some screenwriters idea, it does not reflect reality, just like 24 is not reality). They simply don’t tell anyone outside their team what is done and how it is done. All that is wanted by higher is results how those results were gotten is never mentioned.
Given that both the CIA and the DIA pulled their guys from Camp Nama under his command, the torture of detainees was no secret – see my post from yesterday here – http://firedoglake.com/2009/06…..s-command/
And under command responsibility doctrine, commanders are responsible for the actions of their forces and liable to war crimes prosecution.
To say that you don’t know something as important as torture was going on is pure hogwash. He knew, he approved and would still approve. He’s sitting there before the committee lying his head off. blegh
send teams out on orders that he would have no knowledge of
But most of the abuse charges don’t have anything to do with sending out teams, it has to do with the operation of Camp Nama, the clearinghouse for his main mission – the capture of Zarqawi.
but if rumsfeld directed teams to use torture he would not be aware of that
a) Rumsfeld didn’t direct that they use, he authorized the use.
b) McChrystal has said he was aware of them – you either aren’t reading or don’t want to respond to it, but he says he was aware, was “uncomfortable” with the policies and “worked” to reduce their use.
I do understand the compartmentalization – I also understand the pushes to get mission response. And I also know that when you have the CIA pull out and the DIA pull out of the Camp bec of how it is being run and the rampant abuse, McChrystal wasn’t living in ignorance of those events for long. They caused bigtime uproar.
Perhaps Gen McChrystal should have read the report in the New York Times in March 2006 – it was more than clear.
No that is not what I am saying.I also know that I am making a total mess of what I am trying to say, but while I do know what the command structure is, I am unsure of what words I can use to convey that knowledge. Its just like me-a luddite-talking to a computer nerd at say best buy when attempting to purchase a piece of technology. We speak different languages,I have no idea at all what he is telling me and I am unsure of how to translate. If I use the language that I know, it would totally confuse you, it still confuses me at times. Here is my attempt, it is in no way complete. There are in JSOC different levels of command, while he was in charge of JSOC he was not in operational charge of the teams/units. SEALS or DELTA for example fall under SecDef for operational control. JSOC is very compartmented, it is in no way like like other military commands where the commander develops the mission and assigns units to carry the the mission out. There are several chains of command. It is like he was in overall charge, he could write directives to subordinate units, but his directives could be overridden by the operational command structure. I said it would be confusing. You really have to understand why JSOC was created and why the branchs were able to ceed even some control to a different entity while at the same time maintaining control of that unit. JSOC is a HQ. based at MacDill AFB in Fl. the operational units are not based there.
What about his role in the Tillman cover-up? I wish Levin would press him about that.
Bob in HI
AND THE KILLIN’ GOEZ ON AND ON AND…
Citizen Ackerman and the Firepup Freedom Fighters:
Obama and Levin are clearin’ the way for the military brass to use the “we were only following orders” excuse of the German High Command and it CAN work for the US military but only if there are investigations and prosecutions of ALL those in the political high command. The way this is slowly unwinding, there will be no escape for those in the Bush administration from the OLC attornies right on up thru and including Bush and in payment for keepin their sorry asses out of Leavenworth, the military will be in Obama’s pocket.
KEEP THE FAITH AND PASS THE AMMUNITION, THIS WAR IS OURS, WE PAID FOR IT AND NOW WE MUST END IT!!
McChrystal is basically saying that torture and abuse did not occur under his command.
That if it did, it was authorized.
That even though it didn’t happen but was authorized, he did know about it.
That while it didn’t happen but was authorized, and he knew about it, he was uncomfortable with it and tried to reduce its occurrence although it never happened.
As for this JSOC nonsense, it was supposed to be an advantage of the Special Ops model and McChrystal’s leadership in particular that he worked closely with those who in fact were doing the operations. Now he is being portrayed as just phoning it in in a more distant manner than even in the traditional chain of command. I mean which is it? So many stories. Which one are we supposed to believe today?
That’s the translation. It is exactly as McC says it is – nothing more and nothing less. Just like Lewis Carroll wrote in Alice In Wonderland.
I cannot understand how McChrystal can even be considered for anything resembling promotion.
Part of the whole concept of a chain of command in which those above give orders to those below is to concentrate responsibility at the TOP of of the hierarchy, not at the bottom. An officer of McChrystal’s standing has a well-defined duty to know what happens under his command and, if something escapes him, to accept full responsibility for it. Not knowing about the actions of subordinates is not an excuse or a mitigation. It is, rather, tantamount to dereliction of duty.
American military law demands that a soldier refuse to obey an illegal order and specifically outlaws cruel or degrading treatment of prisoners. All military personnel are trained to know this. Being “uncomfortable” and going along is not a substitute for correct behavior. Nor is it a mitigation: such discomfort surely indicates consciousness of illegality.
Given the above, it seems obvious that McChrystal should not be advanced in any way. On the contrary, he should at best be retired at grade, if not demoted.
The fact that the counterinsurgency community in the services backs McChrystal so enthusistically is just another reason for making an example of him–CoIn is likely to be the future of our military for some time to come, and, historically, depends heavily on intelligence collection and policing tactics. In Iraq and Afghanistan, its practitioners are thus implicated in the torture scandals almost by definition.
Getting anywhere near the mistreatment of prisoners and non-combatants has to be the kiss of death for a military career if we are to ever get the Rumsfeld rot excised from the military. Some will say morale will suffer. I say that morale is suffering even worse right now. The lower ranks see members of their chain of command avoiding blame for illegal, unmilitary behavior that they ordered or at least condoned, while the rank and file go to prison. Junior officers and noncoms either imitate their officers or ruin their careers. Innocents and victims are run through kangaroo courts and/or imprisoned forever. This is exactly the sort of situation that erodes military discipline and destroys morale.
The laws of war and a chain of command are all that makes an army different from a homicidal mob. The difference is, at best, very slight, but very, very important. Bosnia is what happens when a modern army is allowed to operate without close legal restraints and clear command responsibility. Once military norms break down, all social restraints collapse. We are already seeing early signs of this in our own forces, even off the battlefield: murders of soldiers by soldiers, suicides, rapes, drug abuse and drug dealing, extortion, embezzlement, theft of government property. A line has to be drawn.
What? Are you saying that the General did not know about the CIA and DIA pulling their interrogators from Camp Nama, citing the brutality by the SMU there? To use your analogy, it would be like the factory manager of a large factory not knowing that a major parts supplier was pulling out, or that there was a murder investigation going on in the plant, or that the relevant government regulatory agency had operations under investigation.
It won’t fly. Neither does McChrystal’s whining about his unhappiness with Rumsfeld’s approval of torture techniques.
Levin must know McChrystal is lying. I wish I were able to listen to or follow these hearings more closely. As it is, I must thank Spencer and the other commenters for keeping me up to date on this important, but little covered, event.
I think I grasp what you are saying.
One of the disturbing trends under the Bush/Cheyney/Rumsfeld regime was the deliberate muddling of established roles and missions and formal chains of command. Special forces rather than regular forces. Joint Command Centers rather than normal service hierarchy. The White House and DoD going around the Joint Chiefs.
“Flexibility” and “transformation” were the justifications. But the reality–and the reason why US branches of service traditionally resist this sort of thing–is that it obscures and dilutes command responsibility. It makes it easier for the political leadership–the Commander in Chief–to blame problems on the generals, who blame it on the colonels, and so on down the line until the buck stops at Abu Ghraib sargeants and PFCs. It makes it easier to bypass ranking career professionals who insist on regulations in favor of more compliant, politically ambitious junior officers who will do anything for advancement (like Ollie North).
Military operations are not supposed to be deniable. This is part of the checks and balances that insure the legitimacy of orders. It is the guarantee that we give service men and women when they agree to do what they are told and risk life and limb. As I understand it, when a service man or woman doubts the authenticity, legality, or sanity of an order, he or she has a right and duty to query the chain of command. Every level in the hierarchy has to respond by vouching for the order. This insures that the order is real, that it has been thought through and reviewed, and that the officers responsible for originating or disseminating it are on record if anything goes wrong.
Clearly, the Bush/Cheyney/Rumsfeld military organization was intended to shield the higher ups from the consequences of their orders. Which is why I think it is vital that we punish those that collaborated–like McChrystal–and reward those that queried orders, refused, or retired rather than collude with the White House.
thanks for staying on top of this spencer–funny how many things lead back to rumskull. hours after nine eleven he was calling for strikes against Bhagdad. i thought it was a very defining moment in the history of the DOD: immediately after they are presented by the media as being criminally negligent/recklessly incompetent by allowing the pentagon to be attacked by a fucking commercial airplane (of all things), rumsfeld then squawks that we should attack a non-involved country, Iraq. no wonder that they had to dump rummy: he was/is toxic:
my question is: where is rumskull’s sorry ass in the midst of all of these pretend-to-be-investigations of torture?
his bloody fingerprints are on EVERY BLOODY FUCKING STINKING THING!!! And yet he is never held accountable for ANYTHING.
You want to know whats wrong with the media politics in Washington, THINK RUMSFELD.
i bet if he alone was investigated that he would be deeply connected to dozens of monolithic illegal activities.
It doesn’t matter whether the General knows about misconduct under his command or not. He is responsible. That is the point of a chain of command.
Being an officer is NOT the same as being a factory manager. In the military, subordinates can’t quit if they don’t like their orders. They have to do what they are told or go to jail (or be hanged or shot, in extreme cases). As you go down the chain of command, subordinates have less and less independent decision-making authority, so their responsibility is reduced proportionally. Responsibility floats to the top, with command authority.
For example, historically, when a ship runs aground, its captain generally loses his command. Did he cause the grounding? Did he have all the knowledge necessary to avoid it? Probably not, in many if not most cases. But he will be court martialled, nonetheless, and generally convicted and punished for dereliction of duty. That is the burden of command.
When officers will not shoulder this level of responsibility, they have no business commanding others in battle. Indeed, those others are much less likely to follow.
Siun, the article and pictures you will see here were released by CBS prior to the article’s date of 05/04/2004. They pertain to Abu Ghraib, but I had never seen these before. Five years have passed – where are these 3 male animals now?
Taguba’s report on Abu Ghraib included rape and sodomy; yet now he says he saw no pictures of that.
I am mother of a daughter and have grand-daughters. Words cannot describe what these pictures do to me. I’ve always thought that I could not kill, but if that were my child…yes, I could…and maybe if the victim were a complete stranger.
No. Certain commentators have twisted his comments. He verified that what he told the Daily Telegraph was true. But his comments re rape, etc. pertained to the Abu Ghraib photos he saw, not the 2000 or so that are susceptible to release from the ACLU lawsuit.
From Salon’s 5/30 article by Mark Benjamin: