I didn’t have time yesterday to blog this, but it’s remarkable. In keeping with his recent move to restrict U.S. airstrikes out of strategic concern for losing Afghan support for the U.S./NATO war effort, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, is putting forward new rules of engagement significantly restricting NATO forces’ latitude to respond to hostile action in populated areas. To call this a bold move is an understatement. With the exception of protecting troops’ lives, McChrystal is prioritizing the need to prevent civilian casualties above attacking an enemy. Yochi Dreazen reports:
Military officials in Kabul said the "tactical directive," to be released this week, came in response to incidents such as one last month that killed dozens of civilians. Under the new rules, the incident’s deadliest strikes wouldn’t have been authorized.
"We don’t want another Granai," a senior military official in Kabul said, naming the village where last month’s incident occurred. "The tactical gains simply don’t outweigh the costs."
This is a robust effort by McChrystal to prove that he means it when he says that the loss of Afghan popular support will mean the U.S. and its allies lose the war. And it’s sure to be met with opposition from some corners of the military and commentators who think a concern with population protection tips too far into the realm of tactical passivity. (That’s a charitable way of putting a sentiment that Ralph Peters expresses here.)
Crossposted to The Streak.



4 Comments
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Again, this is the right direction for McChrystal to go. The excessive use of air power results in too many indiscriminate deaths and creates a popular anger all out of proportion to it’s tactical value.
I still wonder how this is going to work. When an American small-unit in heavy contact in the field, taking fire from a village calls for CAS, is somebody going to say “no”?
And what happens if an American squad gets chopped up in an ambush and there was a couple of fast movers loitering nearby and they didn’t expend any ordnance? What’s that outcry going to look like?
And what has changed on the ground to allow a reduction in the use of air power? The explanation has been that with limited troops in theater, we needed to rely much more than we would have liked on air power. Do we suddenly have enough troops to redefine the doctrine? Or was that story horseshit all along?
mikey
Im pretty well convinced now that that last airstrike is what got McKiernan shit canned. Now whats up with the airstrike in Pakistan though?
Rather than pulling off all sorts of deals and such, it looks to me like McChrystal is simplifying things. “First, don’t lose.”
As much as I usually despise Ralph Peters’ preening semi-ignorance, I must admit that I think he was making a subtly different point in that article than the one which you seem to be attributing to him. It seemed to me that Ralph is talking more about our own squeamishness as a nation about sacrificing and focusing in order to effectively “win” modern conflicts, rather than the idea that being unwilling to sacrifice other nations’ civilians makes us a bunch of nancy-boys. Not to say that he doesn’t hold that opinion too, of course.
Of more interest to me was this post from the same blog, which lays out a somewhat bigger-picture view of the philosophy that it looks like McChrystal is following. I think that there could be a good deal more support for surgical operations and primum non nocere strategic thinking than one might at first suppose. I find myself looking forward to seeing what the General can do with a good theory, a reasonably free hand, and a pragmatist for a CINC…