I recall some (possibly-apocryphal) story about McNamara considering it his responsibility to attend Georgetown dinner parties and receive verbal abuse about Vietnam, particularly from the antiwar children of the establishment.

Dunno about that, but how about the non-apocryphal story of when he went to dinner at Jackie’s apartment (1966 or 67) and Jackie, fervently antiwar, suddenly at a certain moment in the conversation began pounding her fists on his chest while crying out “Why haven’t you done something to stop the slaughter!” True story, told by McNamara in his book.

Not an evil man, but someone who at times, with LBJ, took loyalty a bit too far and for too long.

I do wish he’d come clean about Nam much sooner. Still, he largely did. That would be in contrast to another key pro-war advisor, nat’l security advisor (to JFK and LBJ) McGeorge Bundy, who kept awfully quiet for 30 yrs and died before his book could be completed. I’m only aware of once, on McNeil-Lehrer, when he softly suggested he’d made mistakes on VN, but the moment quickly came and went. Dean Rusk, a very pro-war hawk whose advice Lyndon greatly admired, never backed down from his stance all the way to the end.

As for alleged stupidity and good judgment, how about McN’s key role in the missile crisis, when he was (iirc) the first to suggest the safer middle-ground approach of a naval blockade? Prior to that, the overwhelming sentiment at the ExComm table was to first attack then invade/blockade.

He also was wise enough to strongly counsel, early and often, against a strike against Cuba unless it could be clearly determined we had located all the missile sites and that they weren’t operational. This helped put a damper on some of the more eager beaver hawks at the table, and helped buy time for Kennedy, who eventually got an admission from some of the hawks that no such clear determination could be had.

Also second Ackerman’s recommendation on “The Fog of War”. If you rent the DVD, watch all the extras too.

Most memorable segment for me was the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the story about Tommy Thompson, former ambassador to the USSR, whose open disagreement with JFK in a meeting saved us all.

For those who want to judge the conduct in WWII, unless they participated, suggest reading all of Studs Terkel’s “The Good War”.

Then again I think it did shackle Reagan somewhat, i.e. keep him from invading all of Central and South America.

Don’t know if it is fascist streak or a combination of arrogance, group think and rampant careerism in the Pentagon.

Let’s say one was senior in the White House or Pentagon and did not agree with our policy. How long would one have one’s position? Is there any room for internal dissent in any large institution? The bad news tends to get driven in by outside events, against a large quota of denial.