I wonder: are you THE Ondelette who frequents Glenn Greenwald’s digs?

If these are U.S. interests at stake, then Cordesman’s first two definitions are means to the ultimate end of the third: ending Afghanistan as a sanctuary for international terrorism.”

I don’t see where Cordesmann claims those are all U.S. interests, first of all. But even if he did, it’s not by virtue simply of reference to terrorism that a decent outcome is necessary for U.S. interests. Basic Afghan wellbeing in any endstate is a basic component for the U.S. to consider its efforts in Afghanistan any kind of long-term success as well. This is a key point that seems to be largely missed in discussions of Afghanistan’s strategic significance. At stake in Afghanistan for the U.S. is not only or even primarily a potential American security threat. Rather, our international standing as a nation that discharges responsibilities that it elects to take on is at stake. By electing to invade the country and change the government there, and continue to occupy the country for years partially for our own purposes, we took on the responsibility to make an effort commensurate with a reasonable expenditure of our resources at rebuilding the country in a way that provides for basic government functionality and minimal human flourishing. It is in our interest now that the iraq misadventure has been deprioritized to put forth that effort, to the extent that a prudent expenditure of resources allows, because to do so will raise confidence in our country’s intention to restore itself to a position of global leadership. I believe that is clearly an objective that is consistent with, even necessary to, our vital interests, and that will pay dividends in our relations in the international community across a range of issues for years to come. Beyond that, such questions of Afghan wellbeing became our concern from an ethical perspective when we deposed their government, and it is in our interest to act in accordance to moral duties we incur by virtue of elective actions we choose to undertake. These are the reasons that acting to promote Afghan wellbeing in and of itself serves U.S. interest, not merely as an instrument to managing threats to physical U.S. security emanating from the region.

I understand what you were saying and what you’ve just said.
I think that what you would like to have happen is desirable, but trying to do this stuff in the middle of a war zone is complicated and made more complex when there are organized and armed groups determined to see that it doesn’t happen.

Overall it might be like trying to put your pants on two legs at a time while holding the baby. It might be possible but it will take much time, practice, concentration and plenty of bruising.

It can’t be a military mission since there are tasks that cannot or should not be done by troops — training police was the example I gave. It can’t be done by relief organizations (this is a criticism of the Europeans mostly) who look good on TV (and are good on relief efforts) because it isn’t relief work and it screws up and retards the development of internal infrastructure when they work in the area for too long. What cannot also happen is that a clear timetable for when it is completed can be worked out until the parties executing the work decide that they can work off of and be held to a timetable.

Otherwise, it was just pretty much completed in Angola by lesser parties than the Great And Powerful U.S. But maybe we just aren’t all that. Pakistan originally hid and protected the Taliban on the belief that the U.S. would tire of the mission and they could move back into power at that point. What do you think happens if the NATO mission withdraws, given that item? Something we promised the Afghan people would not happen.

Now am I making sense?

Have a great day in your world. Goodbye.