But seriously?

To what extent do you actually believe Kayani, as opposed to expecting another offensive-as-theater with lots of explosions, with all the suffering confined to the long-suffering Waziristanis?

It just sounds like another page out Musharraf’s playbook, doing the dollar dance. How many “offensives” will it take to get those F-16s?

mikey

So Pakistan feels they have to put troops on the ground because they know nothing about whats going on.
We think we don’t need troops in Pakistan because our rockets will get Ossma someday its been how many years now?

This should work out well. O expands the third U.S. war against Islam, pulling the strings of its puppet.

I heard some high ranking military guy talk about counterinsurgency on cspan2 this morning. I listened off & on for about 45 minutes. Couldn’t understand a word he said. It was all acronyms and jargon, one of the usual ways that fields of expertise hide their ignorance.

Running out of targets is a good thing, right?

Do you really mean that we’re fighting a war (or three) against Islam?

OK, this makes no sense to me at all. The Pakistani army is going to move into Waziristan in October. This gives them almost no time to conduct ground operations before winter sets in. I doubt that they have pre-positioned assets in the area to block off the major exits, which means that most of the high value targets will have plenty of time to leave, dig in, or hide. To me this suggests a punitive expedition to shoot up the place. I still see no evidence of Pakistan moving to deal with the ISI and military types involved in the various insurgency groups operating on Pakistani soil. The problem is that these groups end up not just posing a threat to Pakistan’s neighbors but to Pakistan itself.

Look at it from their POV.

Why not just bring our guys home and give us some healthcare instead?

Good points.

There are an awful lot of “theys” there, eCAHN. I doubt if there’s any more of an “Islamic” POV than there is a “Christian” POV.

Freaking Jindal turns down huge stimulus money for his state:

Jindal aides have said the administration is not applying because of concerns about the project’s ongoing costs. They said the state would incur an annual $18 million bill to run the rail system once it became operational. […]

But U.S. Rep. Anh “Joseph” Cao, R-New Orleans, on Friday called on Jindal to apply for the money. Since all U.S. taxpayers will foot the bill for the stimulus spending, Cao said, the state’s elected officials should see that Louisiana gets its fair share. “It’s our duty to obtain as much as we can to rebuild this region,” Cao said at a news conference at his city’s train station.

Sorry, Think Progress.

Look at the polls.

Are you a communist or something?

Jeez

If the Pakistanis expect us to take their war seriously, they have to think up a better name for that place then Waziristan. They might as well call it Upper Wazoo.

Where is this Af/Pak people speak of? I must need a new globe; it doesn’t appear on mine.

Too many of the people responsible for crafting policy profit from the continued chaos.

It is absurd and pointless conjecture since it could never happen but because I have an absurd and pointless mind, I wonder what effect the simultaneous legalization of heroin in every industrialized nation and it’s subsequent devaluation would have on the conflict?

I ain’t the brightest bulb so maybe you could give me more of a hint about which polls.

They would make the growers plant twice as much?

Lisa Derrick is upstairs!
Texas-Two Step: Same-Sex Divorce Before Marriage Equality?

Wouldn’t do any good, they would be in competition with now legit growers around the world. The Afghan poppy trade would go belly up.

As I said, absurd conjecture.

“Do you really mean that we’re fighting a war (or three) against Islam?”

Duh!

didn’t strain yourself with that exposition, did ya?

care to try an entire sentence?

From Wikipedia:

The Agency has hot summers and very cold winters. In winter, temperatures go below freezing point in places of high altitude. The summer season starts in May and ends by September. June is generally the warmest month when the mean maximum temperature rises slightly over 30 degrees Celsius. The winter starts in October and continues until April. December, January and February are the coldest months. The mean maximum and minimum temperatures for this period are 10 and -2 degrees Celsius, respectively. The Agency is outside the monsoon zone, yet at higher altitudes a fair amount of rainfall is received. South Waziristan Agency has an arid climate, receiving minimal precipitation. The western portion, bordering Afghanistan, receives more rainfall than the eastern portion touching Tank and D.I.Khan districts. Most of the Agency receives mean annual rainfall of 6 inches, while a small area in the southeastern corner receives less than 10 inches (250 mm) of rainfall annually.

Yes, unless it means they’ve just hidden from your view. So, it appears they’re going in more fully to take a look around and see if the area is relatively clear of enemy.

Maybe the discussion about the Taliban being resurgent in Afghanistan just means they’ve left Pak and returned to Af. If that’s true I have to wonder how Gen. McChrystal missed them. Maybe he needs more eyes.

Way to go Rep Cao!

I would begin by assuming that Official Pakistan’s comment that they have little intelligence on Waziristan is disinformation.

This attack has been in the cards for several months. Much of the “civilian” population has moved out over the last 6 weeks or so to the adjoining district of Tank. What’s left seems to be perhaps ten thousand fighters — reading the Pakistani press, it looks like roughly half and half Taliban connected Waziri’s and the other half Uzbeks, Arabs, and fighters from other parts of Pakistan — particularly South Punjab where apparently Taliban is well organized. The Pakistani press occassionally reports criminal gangs mixed in among them — probably connected with the drug and other smuggleing trades. In the last few weeks I have noticed several articles reporting the Pakistani Taliban re-location of the leadership to Karachi — don’t know whether it is good info, or disinformation.

The US drones seem to be taking down about three fighting compounds per week in this area, most reported to be “foreign militants” which in Pak speak probably means Arabs or Uzbeks. At least the drones seem to have decent intelligence, which I assume is supplied by ISI or the Pakistani Army. There have also been interesting stories in the Gulf press in recent weeks about the re-location of fighters previously in Waziristan to Yemen. Again — could be true, or could be disinformation. You have to keep sorting it all out.

My own analysis at this point is that the Pakistani Army has fairly strong support among Pakistani’s for clearing out the FATA, much as Swat was cleared out this summer. The Urban Pakistani’s have just had too many random suicide bombings and other attacks — and while they are hardly on board with US policy, they are unified behind self interest in taking down those they view as behind these attacks. The one that really hurt was the attack on the Sri Lanka Cricket Team last spring, which essentially ended all international Cricket in Pakistan for the foreseeable future. Pakistan is Cricket mad — The attack was something like what would happen here if mobs attacked a contending Baseball team in the midst of the World Series.

Taken as a whole, I suspect the US and Pakistan agree on a strategy whereby Pakistan takes control of the FATA, and leaves part of its army behind to retain order and keep the various militant groups from reestablishing themselves, much as they seem to be doing in Swat. Whether that changes our position in Afghanistan, I don’t know. But I assume that the large appropriation that was passed by congress this week designated for reconstruction in the Pakistani FATA is part of a bargin.

“Maybe the discussion about the Taliban being resurgent in Afghanistan just means they’ve left Pak and returned to Af. If that’s true I have to wonder how Gen. McChrystal missed them. Maybe he needs more eyes.”

MarkH — though they are similar in some respects, the Afghani and the Pakistani Taliban are quite different entities. In Afghanistan they are a sort of shadow government, based in part on the organizational structure that controlled Afghanistan prior to 9/11. They have a fairly well developed chain of command under Omar, who reportedly is either in Karachi or in Quetta. The Pakistani Taliban is an assortment of tribal alliances that can change rapidly, as they did this summer with the death of Massud. Yes they help each other, but they are otherwise distinct. You have to keep the distinctions in mind as you follow the story.

Thanks, Sara, extremely helpful comments at 27 and 28.

If you were in McChrystal’s boots, what would you do and what would you ask for wrt Afghanistan?

A lot depends on who the Pakistani Army decides to move against in Waziristan. They have huge popular backing for moving against the TTP, and the NYT article seems more focused on such a move. They have less popular support moving against any Afghan directed insurgencies, which have support in the Pakistani Army, the ISI, and the people to some degree.

The figures cited for LeT in Pakistan (150,000) in the NYT the other day are disturbing, and indicate continued support for outward directed insurgency groups, like the Afghan Taliban and LeT.

From Teeth Maestro:
http://teeth.com.pk/blog/2009/…..man-rights

“If you were in McChrystal’s boots, what would you do and what would you ask for wrt Afghanistan?”

Well, I would never find myself in McCrystal’s boots — but for several years I have been trying to channel the guy I consider the best Political/Military Specialist the US ever produced, George C. Marshall, and have tried to imagine him in McCrystal’s or any of the other current General’s boots.

I think we have to get much greater clarity on the political level as to the before and after with respect to Afghanistan. Marshall always taught that wars always begin in a maze of political failures, and if they successfully end, the winning side (and he never intended to be on any other side) has a reasonably specific understanding of the shape of post war politics, sufficient that the possibility of pre-war failures of politics are disolved. Everything that comes inbetween the pre-war and the post-conflict tactically serves the objective — and it is clear how it so connects. Marshall also said other things — the US had no patience for long wars, so they should be planned to be short, He believed strongly in working with congress — but treating dumb congresscritters with distain, He thought logistics strategy more important than any other element in a campaign. (I thought kindly on this element of Marshallism the other day while listening to an NPR report on a Wisconsin manufacturer of M-RAP transports (the heavy armored things with V shaped undercarriage that deflect IED’s) just now setting up the extra assembly line to build them for Afghanistan. Aah the glories of “just in time” production schedules.) You wonder what idiot in the Pentagon didn’t order lots of these a couple of years ago?

I think Afghanistan’s problems are not properly defined — I don’t discount the need to understand the tribal structures, or to comprehend the religious/cultural side of things, but I am convinced the real division in Afghanistan is between the modernizers and the traditionals — with the modernizers being primarily in Kabul, Herat, Mazar, and other urban areas — and the traditionals mostly in the hills. This was the division back in the 1960’s before the King was deposed, and before the Soviets invaded, and it pretty much defines who went abroad during the 80’s. and who stayed behind to fight the Soviets. Part of our American Problem is that we sided with the Traditionals, as defeating the Soviets was the highest interest of the US. Ronald Reagan’s “Freedom Fighters” were in fact the most regressive and oppressive forces in Afghanistan, and we have never admitted the huge mistake, and officially reoriented ourselves.

Right now any clear US Exit Strategy in Afghanistan really requires a social outcome where the more Urban Modernizers control the whole country, because in the end it was the Traditional segment of the population that allowed the country to be used to Al-Qaeda’s ends, namely attacks on symbols of modernism world wide. (I line up the targets we know of, our African Embassies, Madrid Trains, French oil tankers, London Undergrounds and busses, planes, Bali Night Clubs, Mumbai Trains and 5 Star Hotels, and of course the World Trade Center, Pentagon and the Cole — and they are all symbols of modernism.) I think we need this kind of clarity of thinking.

Largely as a result of the war against the Soviets, Afghani’s in Pakistan came to dominate the Pakistani trucking industry. These are business folk, they are “modernizers” and about a million of them live in Karachi along with more than 20 million Pakistani’s. They are still Afghani’s, they are not citizens of Pakistan, but they dominate this entire sector of the Pakistani economy. Any US strategy that seeks to move toward a politics that has no place for Al-Qaeda, tribal wars and all the rest needs to be built on the dynamic of these kinds of “modernizers.” After all, our political goal should be to establish the dynamics of modern businesses and enterprises that can support families, and all — and are less likely to tolerate domination by Traditional forces.

I realize this is a fairly crude cut of a very complicated ethnic/cultural structure, but I believe something like it should drive military strategy if the end result is to be some sort of power relationships that will clearly prevent any faction in Afghanistan offering hospitality to al-Qaeda or any outfit like it. And I think that is a pre-condition for our leaving, and it should be made clear as a strategic objective. In effect it is still the civil war that began in the 1960’s, but our interests are now with the Urban Modernizers — who were, ironically, those most interested in what the Soviets had to offer in the 80’s.

McChrystal’s plan as I understand it does focus on delivering security, justice and services to larger population centers — I would agree with that completely. But there also needs to be a strategy of pushing that out from the cities in a dynamic way. Above all, I think it needs to be clear to the Afghans that the US and NATO intend to remain until they get contol over the factions who would link up with and support Al-Qaeda and similar outfits.

It’s an interesting theory, and there is some merit to it. I think it focuses far too heavily on the Afghans, and leaves out two populations that are crucial to understanding what’s going on. First, it leaves out the second generation refugee population that are largely those who make up the Taliban. They are, as Ahmed Rashid showed in his book, Taliban, a population that is ethnically Afghan (they are largely Pashtun), but have grown up without absorbing any of the cultural roots of their own country. Instead, they have been schooled in madrassas which are largely focused solely on the Koran, and led by Arab imams.

Which brings us to the other population that has been left out, the Pakistanis. The Pakistani Army and the ISI created the Taliban, just as they created Lashkar-e-Taiba (above I noted the figure of 150,000 for LeT membership cited Sept 30th) and Jaish-e-Mohammad as insurgencies to be “native uprisings” in Kashmir. The Taliban are not the mujahedin who fought the Soviets except for a few warlords who have worked their way in, most of those people are among the current warlords in Afghanistan.

In this scenario, the origins of al Qaeda, and what it was and currently is, are important. Many of the top people were also not originally fighters, Zawahri and bin Laden originally did social work (or medical, Zawahri is a doctor) in the refugee camps before they fought. There are still 3.5 million refugees, and they can be similarly radicalized, no plan that doesn’t resettle them will work. And al Qaeda was like a conglomerator, a corporate group that assimilated already existing training camps under one management system. That’s why Ibn al Shaykh al Libi and Abu Zubaydah were not part of it but Zubaydah freelanced for it. They were still “indie”.

Al Qaeda is doing its training camp and strategizing role again in the FATA. It also currently provides contacts in the emirates and elsewhere for the distribution of heroin. But the people being trained, and the people being recruited, are very much involved in the Pakistani program of creating insurgencies to do regional hegemonic politics. Witness Carlotta Gall’s piece a couple of years ago, showing that recruitment for suicide bombings was being done directly by the ISI in Quetta. Afghans in Afghanistan won’t blow up their own, but displaced Afghans and Pakistani Pashtuns will. As will children. Baitullah Mehsud’s brother has been known to recruit bombers as young as 7 years old.

Therefore, no solution that ignores making the Pakistanis stop using that tool of international politics can ever work. In fact, most of the “military solution” to the whole mess needs to be on the Pakistani side of the border, which means it needs to be Pakistani. That only happens by supporting things like the Charter for Democracy, and encouraging General Kayani’s move to keep the Army out of politics, and evincing genuine interest in seeing Pakistan succeed as a nation. Solutions within Afghanistan need to be much less military, and much more appropriate.