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For a wonderful glimpse into Afghan perspectives about the war, read this excellent Post piece now. A few weeks ago, Defense Secretary Gates said Gen. McChrystal persuaded him that the most important criterion fueling Afghan perceptions of occupation isn’t the large presence of foreign troops, but how those troops behave and who they benefit. The piece supports that observation very thoroughly. This isn’t Iraq from 2004 to 2006, when the sheer presence of U.S. forces drained legitimacy from the host government in the view of the populace. Afghans take a far more transactional and less ideological perspective: they are not pro-American, they are not pro-Taliban, they are not pro-Karzai; they are, rationally, going to support those whose actions best support their interests.
Put another way, our actions can very well inflame the insurgency and alienate the population, and they have, for years. But our presence alone does not inexorably march to that conclusion. This distinction remains a precious commodity to be either seized or squandered. And this guy has some ideas about that:
"If you look around, you see nothing but jobless people," said Qari Imam, 30, who sells children’s clothing in the market here. "A lot of people who join the Taliban are jobless, too. If you want to stop the fighting, don’t send us more troops; build us more factories."
McChrystal’s answer is that he wants to do both. In addition to urging additional troops, he said in London that NATO could clear the battlefield of more than half of Taliban forces by offering jobs instead. (And that’s a consensus — and even conservative — estimate as, say, David Miliband‘s recent speech demonstrates.)
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I wrote this a while back irt McChrystal’s answer.
I still think economic development should be the the first priority. Bring employment and then make a determination on the need for troops after you reduce the Taliban forces through employment.
It’s easy to say “build factories,” or “increase employment,” but that’s essentially meaningless when you look at the situation on the ground. What kind of work are Afghans able — or willing — to do? What kind of economy do you want to stimulate in Afghanistan? To do anything in Afghanistan is essentially to start from scratch with a largely illiterate, pre-modern population. I watched the training of the ANSF last month in Khost, and it seems to me the biggest problems we (ISAF) faces are instilling basic time management skills and teaching NCOs and officers the skills needed to be able to prioritize goals, and ways to reach them. As an American, it’s just staggering to watch. Let’s not underestimate that while we might want to try and build an economy, we first have to build a culture that can run that economy. And that ain’t nuthin’.
This is a sensitive subject, but Paul, do you really mean Afghans are not “culturally” prepared for working? I want to be sure I understand you.
No, not at all, I’m just saying that someone needs to define for me what an Afghan economy might look like. Is it purely agrarian? If not, where would you even begin building any sort of industrial base? My experience is very very limited, so I can’t claim anything close to expertise on Afghan culture or patterns of life, but what do “jobs” mean to Afghans? Has anyone asked them?