Ackerman’s analysis misses a key point: you’re not limited to one level of screen. A false positive on a mammogram is a bad thing, but its immediate result is an unnecessary biopsy, not an unnecessary mastectomy. In general, you want the first screen to be cheap to administer and very tight (”highly sensitive” in the technical jargon), accepting that it will produce a big crop of false positives, because the result of triggering that alarm is a follow-up test that can be much more expensive but is designed to be much less prone to false positives (”highly specific”).
There was no need to decide, just based on the information in hand, whether to let Mr. Abdulmutallab board the flight. All you needed to figure out was that he needed to have a body scan and a careful hand-luggage check before boarding. You might not want to do that to every passenger, but you’d be willing to do it to tens of millions of innocents to prevent one explosion.* Thought of that way, I’d say that the warning from Abdulmutallab père should have been enough, all by itself, to justify asking Abdulmutallab fils to step out of line and see the nice man in the booth.
I could quibble with this, but really, this is basically the balance that I’ve been vaguely pointing to. I’ll buy it. The only thing I’d say is that there may be a point at which we’re talking mastectomy (no-fly) passing itself off as biopsy. Because you can imagine some circumstance whereby a terrorist beats even a full-body scan. Let’s say he’s a bodybuilder and grabs a fellow passenger, threatens to snap his neck, and parlays that into control of the aircraft. (I know this is baroque, but so is underpants-bombing.) At that point, the congressional inquiry to follow asks — as the media has been asking in Abdulmutallab’s case — why was Jihadi The-Body Ventura allowed on the plane in the first place?
This isn’t to say I don’t buy Mark’s point. I do. But to some degree, homeland security fixes are answers that defer a fundamentally political problem: how much risk of terrorist attack are we willing to accept as a society? I don’t pretend to know how to quantify the answer, but it’s, uh, somewhere between Zero and One Hundred. There is a lot to be said for not facing up to the question. No-fly lists and airport scans and cargo-hold checks and so forth have the virtue of helping keep people alive at relatively low cost. I like the idea of technological ingenuity creating ever-better prophylactics against attack instead of saying, “Well, we just have to live with the occasional thing blowing up…” or even “that sucked; but as long as we have Hydrocarbon Man, we’re going to be backstopping some odious fucking dictatorships in the Middle East and people are going to be pissed off; a shame that conservatives are standing in the way of ending the era of Hydrocarbon Man…”
But at some point we reach the liberty-tradeoff point of absurdity, and it wouldn’t be such a bad thing to try and think through the point at which we want Security and Liberty to converge.



6 Comments
Support this site!
Subscribe to the newsletter
Advertise on Firedoglake
Send
us your tips
Make us your homepage
About ATTACKERMAN
RSS/XML Feed
“that sucked; but as long as we have Hydrocarbon Man, we’re going to be backstopping some odious fucking dictatorships in the Middle East and people are going to be pissed off; a shame that conservatives are standing in the way of ending the era of Hydrocarbon Man…”
That would be an especially lame thing to say, because it’s false–they aren’t. John McCain himself called our oil dependence a “national security” issue, and if liberals really wanted to do something about energy dependence–as in we were willing to accept offshore drilling and nuclear–then we could fix this issue and tell the dictators to screw themselves. We can no longer blame conservatives for this one. I don’t think we can even blame Obama at this point–we all should have been calling out louder for this.
That said, when we’re talking about a case like this in which a reasonable liberal/utilitarian case could be made for doing more, as Kleiman argues, I really don’t see the value of having the first principles philosophical fight now.
Spencer, In case you haven’t seen these angles, if there is any basis in truth therein, I wanted to turn you on to this and ask you what you think about it.
http://angryarab.net/2009/12/31/here-we-go-a-conspiracy-theory-without-evidence/
He’s talking about our gas/oil dependence, not the source, as all those resources are finite. Nuclear power has nasty by products that have to be stored and no one wants them in their backyard. Solar, wind and energy storage is the future.
Spencer — Mark’s post is good, but I don’t think he really addresses the most important point you made earlier. The question of much info it takes to place a suspect on a watch or no-fly list is important. But I read your post as addressing a separate issue – what are the costs of benefits implicit in the intelligence sharing decisions that occur up the chain from this final judgment.
It is easy look at all the info known to the USG before the attack and conclude that this was an obvious failure to connect the dots. (The President seems to have done so, although he hasn’t said exactly what “systemic failure” he thinks occurred.) But I think that the critical insight of your post was that each act of pushing info up to NCTC itself has costs and benefits – and as a result this may have been a “failure” to appropriately share information, or it may have been a policy choice, and a rational one at that.
If we conclude that the info here was of the quality and type that should have been flagged and sent up the chain, then we are concluding that all comparable info should also have been flagged. Maybe that would be a good thing. But maybe it would overwhelm NCTC with vague/unhelpful/useless information. It depends a lot on how much comparable information the collecting agencies gather each day, and that’s gonna be pretty hard for folks outside the system to address.
Mark and Kevin Drum both look at the question of what type and quality of information should be sufficient to place a suspect on a watch or a selectee or a no-fly list, but the same type of decision analysis applies to earlier stages in the process.
To be clear, I don’t know if the information at issue here should have been pushed up to NCTC under current standards or not. If it should of, but wasn’t, that is one kind of problem. But your post, to me, flagged a different, important possibility.
Yeah, sam75309 has a good point. Discussing the liberty/security tradeoff at all might just be a distraction. Worse, I’m not sure this point is going to get a fair hearing. It’s hard to imagine someone from NCTC testifying that having more information will make their performance worse, not better.
That said, it’s not clear to me that you really have to go as far up the decision chain to mark someone for extra pat-downs as you do to ban them from flying.
What about increasing the number of bomb sniffing dogs at all airports?
The ICE has increased the number of dog sniffing teams at our border crossings with good results. It seems to me that this could be a very cost effecient way to screen for many types of threats to our airliners.
And if the experience of the Marines during the Second World War could guide our thinking on current efforts it would tell us that most any dog breed can be trained for this type of service.
I think it was on the Discovery Channel but War Dogs of the Pacific is well worth watching.