Wow, the AP did a number on Matt Levitt & Yoram Cohen’s new paper on al-Qaeda, Hamas and Gaza. Levitt was kind enough to email me the paper after seeing my post, and the wire service clearly mischaracterized its contents. The two WINEP authors do not suggest that Hamas is auditioning for al-Qaeda — far from it; they’re thorough about cataloging the substantial differences in interests and outlook between the two organizations. Their report concerns marginal globalist takfiri groups in Gaza, some of whom have splintered off of Hamas, but none of which have even been embraced by al-Qaeda. Nor are their prospects for becoming a new AQ franchise very good:

[T]he prospect of a true al-Qaeda affiliate developing in this area remains unlikely for several reasons. Palestinians living alongside Israel have suf- fered under occupation but have also seen up close the benefits Israelis enjoy by living in a moderate, prosperous, democratic society. The vast majority of Palestinians do not want their cause globalized by al-Qaeda or anyone else; they want sovereignty, eco- nomic prosperity, and control over their own lives independent of Israeli authorities.

I wrote earlier I was surprised to see that Levitt and Cohen took the approach they were misreported to have taken; now I know why. Apologies to them for hinging off an erroneous AP story.

Still, this conclusion is a bit besides the point:

Some have argued that the existence of al- Qaeda-inspired groups in Gaza means that Hamas is no longer the worst option and that Israel should engage with Hamas without preconditions lest al-Qaeda take over the Strip. In fact, these groups, lacking significant numbers and grassroots support, cannot pose any real political threat to Hamas in Gaza or Fatah in the WestBank.

I’m not sure who argues that, since the authors don’t cite anyone making that case. But it strikes me as less important for policy to focus on negotiations with Hamas than on why Palestinians might experience, in the authors’ words, “still greater Islamist radicalization.” Why might there be a constituency for still-greater Islamist radicalization? And what might be the right policy approach to diminishing that constituency?