A brief history of the last nine years: terrorists attack America. America invades Afghanistan. America, in a kind of dramatic way, tells Pakistan it’s either with us or with the terrorists. Pakistan’s leader chooses us but doesn’t appreciate being told like that, and the Pakistani people appreciate it even less. Pakistani Army takes rare-to-unprecedented step of moving into the tribal areas to knock some heads around. Afghanistan war enters a false-dawn phase and America’s attention moves to Iraq, but not before CIA and ISI go Tango & Cash on Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Meanwhile, Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda set up shop in tribal areas, eventually Quetta and (probably) north Waziristan. Pakistan figures meh, even when Ayman Zawahiri puts out a bounty on Pervez Musharraf’s head. Figures that it’ll see how this Afghanistan thing plays out. U.S. doesn’t like it and tells Musharraf so. Musharraf replies that the U.S. can always give him some cash. U.S. replies that it’s got $10 billion lying around and actually literally pays in cash. But the U.S., which is in the middle of a quagmire in Iraq, doesn’t have either the patience or wherewithal to do more than administer the occasional lecture to the Pakistani leader, causing relations — which do not go deeper than leader-to-leader — to fray. Meanwhile, things begin to deteriorate in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda shows increasing signs of life. In Waziristan, a Pakistani Taliban emerges. Musharraf cuts some deals with it that don’t work. U.S. complains and does nothing else, except sign secret finding allowing JSOC and CIA to occasionally raid in Pakistan and fire some drone strikes. Both are moves to compensate for perceived Pakistani intransigence. Guy runs for president saying he’s going to change the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, but there are even some conditions of total emergency that will compel him to invade. Pakistan undergoes sustained political crisis relating to the military dictatorship’s disregard for civil society. Dictator falls. That guy becomes president of the United States.

New president, who stakes his presidency on successfully concluding the war with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan/Pakistan, accelerates the drone strikes in Pakistan; and massively emphasizes counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, complete with 50,000-plus new American troop reinforcements, a new command structure and significantly increased diplomatic/development resources. He also has another idea for Pakistan. Rather than tell it what to do and invite the natural resistance, he’ll broaden the relationship and meet the Pakistanis where they are:

Pakistan’s decision to go after the Afghan Taliban leadership reflects a quiet shift underway since last fall, said officials from both countries, who cited a November letter from President Obama to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari as a turning point.

The letter, which was hand-delivered by U.S. national security adviser James L. Jones, offered additional military and economic assistance and help easing tensions with India, a bitter enemy of Pakistan. With U.S. facilitation, the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers have agreed to meet next week, the first high-level talks between the two countries since terrorist attacks in Mumbai in late 2008.

The early results are in, even if they’re not 100 percent crystal clear. And it turns out the second way is a lot better than the first. This is much more than an isolated bunch of counterterrorism wins and a box-check on an insurgent leadership org-chart. If Pakistan really is showing that it’s turning decisively toward the U.S. — provided the U.S. help it on a variety of issues dear to the Pakistani national interest — then that’s the game right there. The Taliban leadership will have to consider how long it can wage war without sanctuary, on the run in Pakistan now, and when it will have to sue for peace — in combination with intensified U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan to cleave it from the public it governs through fear and coercion. Since the price of any such peace is a break from al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda will have its most important area of strategic depth denied it. Nothing — nothing at all — is inevitable, but this is looking more and more like an endgame for them.