Here I was, with my sentimental peace-processor heart, encouraged by the floated plan for President Obama to put forward a U.S. plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by midwifing a Palestinian state. Marc Lynch, in a post I somehow missed a week ago, has some pragmatic objections:

Presidential intervention is a precious asset, to be used at a moment when it’s likely to make a difference. American credibility on the issue is low because of Obama’s failure to win a real settlement freeze from Netanyahu or to impose any significant costs for Israeli refusal. A presidential speech at this point will probably be dismissed across the region as just more words. Netanyahu will almost certainly dismiss it out of hand, and no consequences will follow. Arabs and Palestinians will embrace the high level American involvement they’ve long urged, but will not make any concessions before they see the Israelis doing so. The moment will come and go, little will be accomplished, and then a card which can only be played once will have been wasted.

Try as I might to not want this to be true, it’s a compelling argument. The questions become: when does the Obama administration think it has the spadework completed; and what will it look like ahead of completion. Pressure, cajoling, a combination of…?