[A] Special Operations detachment has returned to southern Marja to work with tribal leaders to organize young men into armed neighborhood-watch patrols, and the Marines intend to destroy several footbridges spanning irrigation canals that insurgents are using to infiltrate the area.

The rest of Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s excellent piece is about how the Afghan government is a bit player in Marja. So how integrated into government structures can tribal auxiliaries possibly be?

Additionally: Gen. McChrystal recognizes the depth of Taliban support in Kandahar and shifts his strategy accordingly. That’s the kind of intellectual and strategic flexibility you want in your commanding general. The question is how far he’s willing to take it. At what point does the depth of Taliban support in Kandahar invalidate the premise that the Taliban can be rooted out? And if you were the Taliban, why would you negotiate peace with the Afghan government?