“Everything old is new again,” assesses Michael Bruno of Ares after checking out the Hadley/Perry alterna-QDR. Its principal criticism of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review is that the document didn’t invest significantly enough in the Navy and the Air Force. And it’s not wrong. After all, the 2010 QDR recommended cuts to both services’ program priorities and expressly devoted its emphasis to the ground forces and immediate, manifested priorities and threats like Afghanistan, terrorism and cyberattack.

The question for Steve Hadley and Bill Perry is why the Gates Pentagon should go back to the same solutions for the same strategic framework of big state-based threats that characterized the U.S. defense posture in the second half of the 20th century. It’s not like Gates & company neglect the Navy and the Air Force and their missions in the 2010 QDR. It’s that the Pentagon made an effort to think through what their missions are and ought to be beyond deterring giant states that aren’t going to confront us any time during the horizon. I’ve seen good arguments from the U.S. Naval Institute’s blog and Commander Salamander that the Gates Pentagon lacks a sufficient vision for the Navy in the early 21st century.  (And for a great behind-the-scenes account of the debates within the Navy over maritime strategy, here’s a must-read.) What I haven’t seen is a compelling argument for why Gates’ shift in emphasis is inappropriate.