“When word of a crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident that
the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is:
‘Where’s the nearest carrier?’”
–Bill Clinton
80 years ago the idea of an aircraft carrier was a novelty, to be scoffed at by any real blue water sailor. But a decade later the fate of the world was determined, to a large degree, by the aircraft carrier. In the years since World War II, the carrier has represented the pinnacle of international power, a force greater than the entire air force of many nations that could go anywhere, holding capitols as well as navies at risk.
But all organizations and institutions are subject to wrenching change, and perhaps the number one driver of large scale change is technology. And in laboratories around the globe, engineers are getting closer to an effective Anti Ship Ballistic Missile.
Some people want to downplay it. Some people want to panic. But this is the dawn of the ASBM era. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles WILL at some point make it difficult if not impossible to operate large warships in littoral or regional waters. (Those of you saying “yeah, they’ll develop ASBMs and we’ll just develop effective defenses”, let me ask you something. We’ve had ICBMs for fifty years. How’s that defense coming?). The important thing to realize about a warfighting technology like ASBMs is that, once developed,in very short order most blue-water powers will have them. So it is not ONLY the case that the US will be constrained from operating in foreign waters, but other nations will be constrained from operating in US waters. Our inability to attack them will be mirrored by their inability to attack us. It could still be argued that the resulting balance is disproportionate because it is the absolute air dominance that allows the US military to operate in such an unfettered manner. You can’t mass troops or bring up armor or effectively manage logistics when you can’t use aircraft and the US can use as many as she wants.
Of course, it is very difficult to determine precisely when these weapons will exist in a form that works reliably. The extreme difficulty of targeting a ballistic missile with a CEP small enough to reliably hit an underway blue water warship is hard to even think about, and testing under operational conditions is as hard as it is expensive. But all that said, it seems likely that ASBM technology will be deployed, and the very existence of a reliable, over-the-horizon standoff antiship capability with a high probability of kill very much changes seagoing nation’s ability to project power, just as it places effective limits on global freedom of navigation.
Of course, nothing is certain. It’s possible that you just can’t achieve that kind of accuracy against a moving target with a ballistic missile. For that matter, the greatest limitation on developing and deploying directed energy weapons is the huge power requirement, and a carrier can generate plenty of power. So it isn’t inconceivable that by the time the threat is real, there will be effective defense options. But real-world outcomes usually fall somewhere between the extremes, so it would be reasonable to assume that options for power projection and expeditionary interventions will be greatly reduced in the coming decades. Overall, this may turn out to be a good thing. Just as the destructive power of nuclear weapons made the major powers more hesitant to engage in large wars, advances in missile and drone technology may make even smaller actions difficult or impossible. Humans aren’t likely to swear off killing each other any time soon, but reductions in the scale of that killing would certainly be welcome.



6 Comments
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This is a pretty disappointing post. There’s a large literature on the potential strategic impact of ASBMs, as well as the field of likely responses. You’ve touched on none of this; fair to say that it’s considerably more complex than “how’s that ICBM defense coming.” Moreover, this…
… displays an utter misunderstanding of the role that ASBMs play in the system of anti-carrier technologies. First, powers don’t need to be “blue water” in order to employ, or want, ASBMs. That’s rather the point of having an anti-access technology. Second, I doubt that the US will be developing ASBMs anytime soon, for the simple reason that the USN can already sink any ship that it chooses to sink. Third, ASBM capability assumes a high degree of intelligence, industrial, and electronic national capacity, and thus is not simply something that any state can pursue at reasonable economic cost. It’s not just the missiles; it’s having the missiles in sufficient numbers to defeat counter-measures and avoid pre-emptive attacks, and having an information support system that can actually allow the missiles to have effect.
Please make at least a middling effort to research the topic…
I’m with Robert – this was a disappointing, superficial post with little real understanding of the impact and limitations of ASBMs.
Robert already laid out some of the major issues with your post, but I might add another: anti-missile technology is also accelerating quite rapidly. It’s not unlikely that we’ll have some very effective anti-missile, solid state lasers in the next 10-20 years, when you consider that they’re already testing a variety of them. That’s only one possible counter-measures – there are others.
In addition to that, carriers aren’t just going to sit there conveniently steaming up and down the coast in active war-time. They’re a hit and strike platform, moving in and then moving out into deeper waters.
Extremely well, in spite of the fact that it has had to deal with brutal budget setbacks over the decades. The SM-3′s are doing very well in testing, and even most of the land-based systems have done well (one of the reasons why Russia was so pissed off about having them located next door in Poland). On top of that, it’s been good for decades – they were getting skin-to-skin hits with Nike-Zeus back in the 1950s.
ICBMs are deceptively easy to target, because they follow a predictable flight path until their final stage (most ABM is based around hitting the main missile bus on its accent).
Way back nearly twenty-five years ago, I had to do an analysis for my then employer on the application of DoD software quality standards to what was then the SDIO (Strategic Defense Initiative Office aka “Star Wars” or “missile defense.”)
The absolute one point that every analysis made was that no matter what type of methods SDIO used, the cost of overcoming or fooling them, whether lasers, other missiles, space based, no matter, the cost to overcome was a pittance in comparison to the cost to build.
And the software, which will drive everything has to work perfectly first time out of the chute.
Believe me, NO software applications ever built will work perfectly first time out of the box.
At least as far a China goes, I fall squarely in the “meh” camp. Simply put, in a situation in which China felt that its interests were so threatened that it was willing to risk a war by sinking an American carrier, why wouldn’t they take out the entire carrier group with a nuke? In that case, ASBMs aren’t that much scarier. You can argue about whether the Chinese would want to break the psychological barriers of being the first to use nukes in a conflict after 65 years, but once you’re in a superpower war like that, I think those barriers will suddenly look a lot smaller to both sides.
There’s nearly thirty years of work on discrimination technology since then – none of the proposed countermeasures work anymore aside.
Don’t be ridiculous. All of this technology gets extensive testing before it is fully deployed, so it’s NOT coming fresh first time out of the box.
When exactly did you do your analysis again?
I performed the analysis in 1987.
But that’s besides the point.
The software can be tested up to a point but it can not be fully tested as to all the areas where it needs to operate correctly. There are just too many decision paths and too many ways where errors can be interjected. Sometimes through coding, sometimes through design decisions, sometimes through modeling assumptions.
So far, the “testing” has all been stacked in favor of the defensive side and even then, most tests have failed. Rather like the scene from the TV show West Wing where the bit was:
“The test passed nine out of ten test points”
“Yeah, but it missed the target by 139 miles”
This is not software where even 99.99995% is acceptable. Missiles are launched, along with scatter and all the other countermeasures, there still needs to be the time taken by the software to distinguish between what is real and what is not. All it takes is for one missile to make it through to show how ineffective this is.
And it can bankrupt us while they try to build something that must work. Our government knows this (or is fooling itself) and so do any other governments working in the same area.