(Hi, blog. Have you missed me? Can you forgive me for cheating on you? We have something special here and I don’t want to let you go. But I’ve got to focus on my other commitments at the moment, so I’m going to probably Susie Madrak you for a bit. Is it narcissistic to say I feel guilty?)
Man, how I wish I checked out this New York counterterrorism forum that my old colleague Daphne Eviatar writes up, because Juan Zarate made some excellent points. “We have to have a sense of resilience. Every attack can’t create a maximal response, because it feeds the enemy,” said Zarate, and don’t hold his service in the second-term Bush White House against him. Looking at the proliferation of drone attacks in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan, Zarate noted that al-Qaeda is “baiting the U.S. into a regional quagmire,” which is in the current discourse is practically heretical; undoubtedly true; but (in fairness) still leaves you without a framework for a response that addresses the threat proportionately. Still, it’s refreshing to see someone with as much high-level policy-making experience as Zarate contend that al-Qaeda wins by waving the red cape at the American bull until he slams into the brick wall. For more on this, see Adam Serwer, who’s on fire lately.
Daphne wants to contrast Zarate with Lindsey Graham. I checked out Graham’s AEI speech on Monday — or half-checked it out; I was busy with Danger Room stuff but kept the webcast open as I worked; didn’t seem fair to post about it at the time — and I want to focus on other aspects of Graham’s speech than the ones Daphne ably addresses.
Graham can drive me nuts sometimes. The gap between his obvious intelligence and the timidity or cynicism of his proposals is so glaring. Like here he is talking about Afghanistan. He’s on the verge of making a valuable point to an audience that needs to consider it. “To my hawkish brothers and sisters, what is our plan B? Plan B for the left and the libertarian movement is to leave. Plan B for the right, is see plan A.”
And then… nothing. Senator, you’ll be doing the country a great service if you spell out a Plan B.
In fact, you yourself need to think it through, because on your own terms, we’re about to need it. “And what is losing?” Graham asks. “I think losing would be allowing the Taliban to come back in power in portions or all of the country. I’ve got one simple thought – the Taliban running anything is not a good idea, particularly if you happen to be a young woman who believes in religious freedom and tolerance.”
Senator, meet Hamid Karzai, who’s trying to start peace negotiations with the Taliban. To borrow a trope of yours from AEI, raise your hand if you think Karzai will ultimately have to talk about power-sharing with the Taliban if those negotiations have a prayer of success. I can tell you it’s what people expect in Afghanistan. So: you’ve got the president of the country seeking a situation rather close (to be generous) to your “Failure” scenario. Shouldn’t you find a Plan B?
Right, this post was supposed to be about Zarate and counterterrorism vigilance. But I suffer from mission creep and lack the will to find and implement a mitigation strategy. So I withdraw now, without having achieved my maximal goals for this post but also without having it collapse entirely around me. Accordingly, I must embrace a post-post confusion and resign myself to wonder forevermore if starting to write this was worth it in the first place.



5 Comments
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I’m not sure what you mean by “Susie Madrak you for a bit.”
Are you looking for a Hippie to punch?
Aren’t you Beltway Bozos doing enough of that already?
If “Plan A” was utilizing a military response designed to take and hold territory against another modern military to deter small bands of well-funded trans-national terrorists, we should now be able to honestly assess it’s effectiveness, and determine that it has failed.
Plan B should be what we know works. Go back to a counter-terror approach that utilizes international law enforcement, intelligence agencies and military special operations when warranted. I can’t understand why that would NOT be Plan B.
In places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia there is no other workable option. Due to their remoteness, the terrain, the regional geopolitics and the utter lack of governance, rule of law or infrastructure, there is just no basis for extensive operations on their soil.
Even if the political opposition would exploit this approach as “weak on terror”, our leadership has some obligation to objectively evaluate the options and choose the ones that work the best…
mikey
The whole point of the Iraq surge, the operation that purged Baghdad of Sunnis and resulted in a lot of dead US troops, was the security necessary for reconciliation. There was no reconciliation of diverse relious/ethnic groups.
Now here in Afghanistan we have (besides a sort of military surge) a president who is actually interested in reconciliation and who held a jirga to kick it off. Does he get any support? No. despite the fact that General Petraeus has surmised that the ending of this thing will be negotiations, despite the complexity of the India/Pakistan confrontation, and despite the continued futility of the Nato effort and the lack of citizen support for this debacle, despite all of that not one solitary US politician that I’m aware of has supported the president of the country whom we’re supposed to be helping.
So obviously the US is in it solely for the war profiteers. (We knew that.)
Serwer quotes the Congressional Research Service’s report on homegrown terrorism.
There does appear to be a common thread connecting US official reports about Terrorism. They are always factually wrong in order to promote the Forever Wars. Headley’s father was not an immigrant, but he was possibly a Voice of America CIA Spy. He had returned to Pakistan with Daood and Headley’s mother had to go to Pakistan to get custody. Headley was a spy for the DEA and probably CIA. But the question should be: Why are there so many CIA recruited spies who turn into double agents for Jihad?
The range of possible terms of the power-sharing pretty much contains within it the potential to either meet or to blow out the floor of Lindsey’s humanitarian and security concerns that drive his definition of “defeat” (which I pretty much share). It’s not just a simple question of whether the Taliban is “in power” somewhere, despite Graham’s rather inexplicably framing it that way.